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Moral realism—understood broadly as the view that there are knowable moral facts—is a 
dominant position in contemporary metaethics. This paper will simply assume that moral 
realism is correct. But moral realists are deeply divided over the metaphysical nature of 
moral entities. Moral realism in a hard or robust form is committed to the explanatory 
efficacy of moral facts (see Brink 1989; Railton 1986; Sturgeon 2006; Wedgwood 2007). 
This is coherent with an influential metaphysical view, according to which any real entity 
must be capable of making a difference to the world—that is, it must be able to 
metaphysically explain something else. This view can be found as early as in Plato’s 
Sophist, and has been reinforced and developed in contemporary philosophy (see Harman 
1977; Hawthorne 2001; Kim 1998; Lewis 1983; Papineau 2016; Shoemaker 1984).  
Recently several prestigious moral philosophers, however, have been challenging 
this metaphysical commitment of moral facts and rather proposing a soft version of moral 
[Abstr act ] Several leading moral philosophers have recently proposed a 
soft version of moral realism, according to which moral factsÑ though it is 
reasonable to postulate themÑ cannot metaphysically explain other facts 
(Dworkin 2011; Par Þt 2011; Scanlon 2014). However, soft moral realism is 
faced with what I call the Hard Problem, namely, theproblem of how this soft 
version of moral metaphysics could accommodate moral knowledge. This 
paper reconstructs three approaches to solving the Hard Problem on 
behalf  of the soft realist: the autonomy approach, the intuitionist approach, 
and the third-factor approach. I then argue that none of them is successful.
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realism (see e.g. Dworkin 2011; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014). In their view, moral entities 
are non-natural entities and hence cannot play explanatory roles in other domains; but 
owing to the sui generis character of morality, it is still reasonable to postulate the domain 
of moral facts.  
Let me introduce the distinction between what I call ‘hard moral realism’ and ‘soft 
moral realism’ as follows: 
[Hard Moral Realism] Moral facts can play explanatory roles in non-moral 
domains (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989; Railton 1986, 1989; Sayre-McCord 1988; 
Sturgeon 1985, 2006; Wedgwood 2007). 
 
In contrast, 
[Soft Moral Realism] Moral facts are unable to play explanatory roles in non-
moral domains (Audi 1997, 2013; Dworkin 2011; Enoch 2010, 2011; Parfit 2011; 
Scanlon 2014; Setiya 2012; Shafer-Landau 2003; Wielenberg 2010). 
 
The term ‘explanation’ (‘explanatory role’, ‘explanatory power’, etc.) is used in a 
metaphysical sense.1 If an event/fact/property E is present because of C, I will say that C 
explains E (see Kim 1994; Kment 2014).2 Causation is a typical kind of explanation. For 
example, an assassin’s shooting President Kennedy caused him to die. Then we can say 
that the assassin’s shooting explains Kennedy’s death. But not all instances of explanation 
are those of causation. Ontological (or “vertical”) explanations, such as realization and 
constitution, are clear cases of non-causal explanations. Water’s macro properties, e.g., 
transparency and solubility, are realized by its microphysical structure. In this case, 
                                               
1 I sometimes use the term ‘explanations’ in a secondary sense, referring to explanatory theories, which aim to 
discover explanatory relations in the primary, metaphysical sense. 
2 My discussion is neutral to what kind of entities (facts, properties, events, etc.) are suitable as explanatory 
relata. For the sake of convenience, I mainly speak of facts. And I leave it open whether facts should be 
understood as true propositions or obtaining states of affairs. 
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water’s microphysical structure explains its macro properties, although the former is not 
the cause of the latter.3 
Furthermore, there may also be “horizontal” (or diachronic) explanations that are 
not causal explanations. For example, mathematical facts may figure in (horizontal) 
explanations of physical facts, although it’s not plausible to say that they cause those 
physical facts (Baker 2005; Batterman 2010; Harman 1965; Lyon 2012; Putnam 1975). 
Even physical entities may diachronically explain a phenomenon without causing it. 
According to a number of philosophers, causation is a macroscopic phenomenon that 
only occurs at the macrophysical level (Norton 2007). If this is true, microphysical events 
at the fundamental level could not cause anything, although they may still have 
explanatory powers.4 According to other philosophers, on the contrary, only fundamental 
physical entities can be causally efficacious, whereas higher-level physical entities may 
play a distinctive explanatory role (Jackson and Pettit 1990).  
Some philosophers characterize hard moral realism in terms of causal efficacy 
(Dworkin 2011; McGrath 2014; Sturgeon 2006). But this is too strong and brings about 
unnecessary controversies. Considering that moral facts may play explanatory roles in 
non-moral domains even if they have no causal powers, it is better to formulate hard/soft 
realism in the light of explanatory efficacy.  
In this article, I will argue that soft moral realism is faced with what I call the Hard 
Problem, namely, the problem of how this soft version of moral metaphysics could 
accommodate moral knowledge. Regardless of whether the existence of moral facts is 
                                               
3 Some argue that abstract facts (such as mathematical, logical, and moral facts) can constitutively explain our 
beliefs about those facts (see Bengson 2015; Cuneo 2018). This is a case of ontological explanation. 
4 A more plausible picture is that some effects have no physical causes, although physical events may be 
explanatorily sufficient for the occurrences of those effects (see Zhong 2014, forthcoming). 
 4 
compatible with their explanatory impotence, the knowledge of moral facts seems to require 
that moral facts play explanatory roles in non-moral domains, such as the role of 
explaining our moral beliefs. If moral facts are explanatorily isolated from moral beliefs, then 
it is mysterious how we can have epistemic access to moral facts. Such a requirement also 
applies to other domains of knowledge, e.g. physics, biology, economics, and even 
mathematics. According to many philosophers, for a person to know about a domain of 
facts, those facts must figure in the etiology of her corresponding beliefs. If the real 
explanations of a domain of beliefs are “debunking” ones—namely, explanations that 
don’t appeal to the relevant facts—then the beliefs are not knowledge (Field 1989; 
FitzPatrick 2015; Harman 1977; Joyce 2006; Sosa 2002; Street 2006). 
Here let me introduce a particular version of the explanatory condition on moral 
knowledge:  
[E0] We can have moral knowledge only if moral facts play explanatory roles in 
non-moral domains (such as the role of explaining moral beliefs).5 
 
I regard [E0] as a prima facie plausible thesis; the main purpose of this article is not to 
provide a positive argument for it.6 Rather my paper will focus on whether the soft realist 
can reasonably reject [E0] for solving the Hard Problem. Although the worry about 
whether explanatory inefficacy is compatible with moral knowledge has been raised in the 
literature (even by soft realists themselves), there are very few serious discussions of it. I 
will reconstruct three approaches to solving the Hard Problem on behalf of the soft 
realist: the autonomy approach, the intuitionist approach, and the third-factor approach. Then 
                                               
5 Moral facts may need to explain non-psychological facts for the sake of vindicating moral knowledge 
(Wright 1992). But for our purposes, we can leave this issue aside. 
6 [E0] is even weaker and more plausible than the metaphysical thesis that moral entities can exist only if 
they play explanatory roles in non-moral domains. 
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I argue that none of them can successfully reject [E0]. My criticisms of these approaches 
will partly rely on distinctions/connections between [E0] and three other explanatory 
conditions on moral knowledge that are often confused with [E0].  
 
2. The Autonomy Approach 
While hard realism contends that moral facts play explanatory roles in non-moral 
domains, soft realism denies this. But it is worth noticing that soft realism doesn’t 
necessarily reject the explanatory efficacy of moral facts as such; what the soft realist denies 
is that moral facts can have explanatory efficacy in non-moral domains. Even if moral facts 
fail to explain non-moral facts, one may argue, they can still have explanatory efficacy 
within the moral realm. This is what I call the ‘explanatory autonomy’ approach (Parfit 
2011; Scanlon 2014; Shafer-Landau 2003).  
This strategy is similar to the causal autonomy approach in the philosophy of mind. 
On the autonomy view of mental causation, even if mental properties are incapable of 
causing fundamental physical properties due to the causal closure of physics (or for some 
other reason), mental properties can still cause higher-level properties, such as behavioral, 
social, and biological properties. For the sake of vindicating human agency, mental-
physical causation doesn’t matter much. As long as mental properties can causally 
influence higher-level properties, the causal powers of the mind would still be largely 
preserved, regardless of whether mental properties can cause fundamental physical 
properties (see Zhong 2011, 2014). 
Similarly, it could be contended that even if moral facts can only explain other 
moral facts, this partial explanatory role of moral entities is sufficient for the metaphysical 
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and epistemic purposes of moral realism. Russ Shafer-Landau explicitly adopt this 
strategy: 
Why should we insist that the ontological credibility of moral facts depends 
on their being able to explain things that occur outside of their domain? We 
don’t demand a showing that astronomical facts cause glandular facts, or 
that harmonic facts cause meteorological facts… If the ontological 
credentials of such things are impeccable, without their having to causally 
explain events outside of their own domain, then why should moral facts be 
held to any higher standard? (Shafer-Landau 2003, p. 104). 
 
The autonomy approach suggests that we don’t have to accept [E0]; we should only 
accept [E1], which is compatible with soft realism: 
[E1] We can have moral knowledge only if moral facts play explanatory roles. 
 
However, the autonomy strategy is not a promising approach to saving moral knowledge, 
regardless of whether it is a plausible solution to the problem of mental causation. Here I 
want to offer two reasons. First, explaining only moral facts is far from sufficient for 
defending moral knowledge. The same is true of other domains. For example, if we have 
knowledge about God, it must be the case that God can successfully explain some non-
religious facts (say, the phenomenon of design). It is irrelevant whether the existence of 
God can help explain why there are angels. Shafer-Landau is right that we do not 
demand that astronomical facts explain glandular facts for the sake of defending 
astronomical knowledge. But we do require that astronomical facts explain non-
astronomical facts, for example, facts about telescope readings and facts about our 
perceptual experiences.  
I will discuss the first point in more detail in later sections. In the current section, 
let me focus on my second criticism of the autonomy approach. Regardless of whether 
explaining moral facts is sufficient for moral knowledge, I am afraid that the autonomy 
approach is unsatisfactory for soft realists’ purposes. On closer examination, we will find 
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that if moral facts can explain other moral facts, they must be able to explain non-moral 







M is a moral property, which is instantiated at time t1, and M* is another moral property 
instantiated at a later time t2. M* is realized by a non-moral property N*. It is worth 
noticing that the M-M* explanatory relation is a diachronic explanation. Certainly, not 
all cases of moral explanations that the autonomist considers are diachronic explanations. 
Some moral explanations are synchronic or vertical explanations. Suppose, for example, 
that the moral fact that we have an overriding moral reason to save a drowning baby 
explains why it is morally obligatory for us to do so. This explanation is a case of synchronic 
explanation. But the autonomist (or anyone who endorses the explanatory efficacy of 
moral facts) should agree that moral properties can sometimes diachronically explain 
other moral properties. A person’s bad intention explains why what she did is morally 
blameworthy; some politicians’ discriminatory beliefs explain why the policies that they 
later carried out are unfair; a family’s decent education explains why the kids grew up to 
be good people; and so on. It would be arbitrary to deny diachronic moral explanation 
while accepting synchronic moral explanation. 
In what follows, I will aim to establish that if M diachronically explains M*, 









Explanation Principle’).7 Let me give an example. Joseph Stalin’s evilness explains why 
there was injustice against many intellectuals in the Soviet Union in 1930s. Suppose that 
the particular way of realizing injustice in this case is forcing those intellectuals to work in 
labor camps. It seems to follow that Stalin’s evilness also explains why those intellectuals 
were sent to labor camps. I wish to point out that the downward explanation principle is 
well supported by the influential difference-making approach to explanation: 
[D] A explains B if A makes a difference to whether B obtains (Kment 2014; Lewis 
1986; Strevens 2004; Woodward 2003). 
 
The difference-making approach is widely used for characterizing causation (Lewis 1973; 
Pearl 2000; Woodward 2003). Since explanation is a less demanding relationship than 
causation is, a difference-making approach to explanation is even more plausible than 
such an approach to causation (see Jackson and Pettit 1990; Strevens 2004; Zhong 2014, 
2016). In some cases, even if A makes a difference to B, A does not cause B. We can find 
such examples in both vertical explanations and horizontal explanations. A person’s 
neurological states make a difference to, and hence explain, her supervenient mental 
states, but this is not a case of causation. Mathematical facts can explain physical 
phenomena in a difference-making sense, although mathematical facts don’t cause 
physical facts. 
There are various substantive accounts that can cash out the difference-making 
idea. Here I will introduce two dominant difference-making frameworks: the (classical) 
counterfactualist framework (Lewis 1973, 1986) and the interventionist framework (Pearl 
2000; Woodward 2003). Consider the counterfactualist framework first. 
                                               
7 I do not have to claim that whenever M explains M*, M also explains N*. To reject soft moral realism, we 
only need to establish that if M explains M*, M explains N* in some cases. 
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[DC] A explains B in a difference-making sense if B would not have occurred had 
A not occurred. 
 
According to Lewis’s analysis of counterfactual conditionals, the conditional “if A had not 
occurred, then B would not have occurred” is understood as “some world where neither A 
nor B occurs, i.e. a (~A&~B)-world, is closer to the actual world than any world where A 
doesn’t occur but B occurs, i.e. a (~A&B)-world” (Lewis 1973). In Figure 1, M explains 
M*. Within Lewis’s counterfactualist framework, M* counterfactually depends upon M; 
M makes a difference to whether M* occurs. That is to say, some (~M&~M*)-world is 
closer to the actual world than any (~M&M*)-world. Given that M* is realized by N*, 
any N*-world is an M*-world, and any (~M*)-world is a (~N*)-world. Thus, a 
(~M&~M*)-world is also a (~M&~N*)-world, and (~M&N*)-worlds are a subset of 
(~M&M*)-worlds. So, if it is the case that some (~M&~M*)-world, w, is closer to the 
actual world than any (~M&M*)-world, it is also the case that w, as a (~M&~N*)-world, 
is closer to the actual world than any (~M&N*)-world. In other words, if M explains M*, 
then M will explain N*—the downward explanation principle is thus established within 
the counterfactualist framework (see Zhong 2011). 
Now let’s turn to the interventionist framework. Roughly speaking, on an 
interventionist account, x explains y (where x and y are two variables) with respect to a 
variable set v if an intervention that changes the value of x would also change the value of 
y when all other relevant variables in v are held fixed at some value (Woodward 2003; 
Zhong 2014). Interventionism seems to capture an important difference between genuine 
explanation and mere correlation: if it is a genuine case of explanation, a suitable 
intervention that changes the explanans would also change the explanandum; if there is 
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only mere correlation, on the other hand, the explanandum wouldn’t change under 
relevant manipulation of the explanans. 
Since in our discussion explanatory relata are focused on facts, we can speak of 
two values regarding a fact: the obtaining (or presence) of a fact and the non-obtaining (or 
absence) of a fact. Hence the value of a fact changes when the fact becomes absent under 
intervention. The interventionist account of explanation goes as follows: 
[DI] A explains B in a difference-making sense if an intervention that makes A 
absent would also make B absent (while all other relevant variables are held fixed). 
 
In our case, M explains M*. That is to say, if an intervention were to make M absent, this 
intervention would also make M* absent. Given that M* is realized by N*, if M* is 
absent, N* is also absent. It thus follows that if some intervention were to make M absent, 
this intervention would also make N* absent (while all other relevant variables are held 
fixed). Therefore, if M explains M*, then M will explain N*—the downward explanation 
principle is established in the interventionist framework as well.8 
From what has been argued above, we can see that if moral facts have 
explanatory powers in the moral domain, they would have explanatory powers in non-
moral domains. Thus, if you accept [E1], you should accept [E0]. The autonomy 
approach fails to give any help to soft realism. 
 
3. The Intuitionist Approach 
Now consider another soft realist approach. It is worth noticing that every soft realist 
accepts the doctrine of moral intuitionism—here I use the term ‘moral intuitionism’ as a 
convenient label for the view that (basic) moral knowledge is a priori. Intuitionist moral 
                                               
8 For discussion of downward causation within the counterfactualist framework, see Zhong (2011). 
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epistemology is a primary reason that soft realists reject [E0]: while explanatory efficacy is 
required for knowledge of natural domains, the explanatory requirement does not apply 
to the moral domain, which seems to resist empirical investigation (Dworkin 2011; Parfit 
2011; Shafer-Landau 2003).9 Let me introduce the distinction between moral empiricism 
and moral intuitionism: 
[Moral Empiricism] Moral knowledge is empirical knowledge, in the sense that 
moral beliefs can only be justified by sensory experience (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989; 
Railton 1986, 1989, 2005; Sayre-McCord 1988; Sturgeon 1985, 2006). 
 
In contrast, 
[Moral Intuitionism] (Basic) moral beliefs can be justified in an a priori way, 
without the mediation of sensory experience (Audi 1997, 2013; Dworkin 2011; 
Enoch 2010, 2011; FitzPatrick 2008; Huemer 2005; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014; 
Setiya 2012; Shafer-Landau 2003; Wedgwood 2007).10 
 
In contemporary metaethics, the debate between moral empiricism and intuitionism is 
sometimes centered on the debate over whether moral knowledge requires moral 
explanation. For moral empiricists, ethics is continuous with science; we can have moral 
knowledge only if moral beliefs are results of inference to the best explanation (Brink 
1989; Railton 1986, 1989; Sturgeon 1985). By contrast, moral intuitionists deny that 
explanatory inference is necessary for moral knowledge (Audi 1997, 2013; Enoch 2010, 
2011; FitzPatrick 2008, 2015; Parfit 2011; Shafer-Landau 2003). 
                                               
9 Although all soft realists are intuitionists, not all intuitionists are soft realists. A limited number of scholars 
advocate a combination of hard realism and moral intuitionism (see Cuneo 2006; Wedgwood 2007). This 
could be an interesting topic for further investigation. 
10 Basic moral beliefs are moral beliefs that don’t epistemically depend upon other moral beliefs. Moral 
intuitionism doesn’t have to hold the view that all moral knowledge is immune from empirical evidence; it 
can maintain only that basic moral knowledge is a priori. For example, knowing that torturing a dog for fun 
is wrong depends upon the empirical knowledge that dogs are capable of feeling pain and pleasure, but we 
may know, independent of experience, that torturing a sentient being for fun is wrong.  
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There are two types of empirical knowledge: perceptual knowledge and abductive 
knowledge.11 Obviously, we cannot acquire moral knowledge by mere perception. 
Perceptual experiences, on the standard definition, consist of experiences through the five 
senses, each of which has a distinctive phenomenal character (Siegel 2016). But no 
“sensory phenomenal representation” is possible for moral properties (Audi 2013, p. 33). 
We couldn’t literally perceive rightness and wrongness in the same way that we perceive 
tables, trees, dogs, etc.; a person with perfect perceptual capacities may not detect the 
moral properties of actions and traits.12  
Then we are left with the second empirical method: abduction (or inference to the 
best explanation). Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is essential for extending the scope 
of human knowledge: from knowledge of what is observed to knowledge of what is 
unobserved or even unobservable, from knowledge of other people’s behavior to 
knowledge of their mental states, from knowledge about the present to knowledge about 
the past; and so on (Harman 1965; Lipton 2004). This is exactly why moral empiricists 
attach importance to explanatory inference (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989; Railton 1986, 1989; 
Sayre-McCord 1988; Sturgeon 1985). Geoffrey Sayre-McCord puts it this way:  
A hypothesis should be believed only if the hypothesis plays a role in the best 
explanation we have of our making the observations that we do… Even if 
there are moral facts, and even if some of these facts would help to explain 
others, none will be epistemically accessible unless some help to explain our 
making some of the observations we do. No matter how perfect the fit 
between the content of our moral judgments and a moral theory, no matter 
how stable and satisfying a reflective equilibrium can be established between 
them, the theory will not gain observational confirmation unless it enters 
into the best explanation of why some of our observations are made. (Sayre-
McCord 1988, pp. 267, 269). 
                                               
11 Inductive knowledge can be regarded as a particular form of abductive knowledge. 
12 Some philosophers speak of moral perception in a loose and metaphorical sense. For them, to say that one 
perceives a particular moral fact that P is just to say that one directly knows that P without the mediation of 
inference (see e.g. Audi 2013). For present purposes, it suffices to note that the so-called “moral perception” 
is a non-empirical way of knowing moral facts. 
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However, according to moral intuitionists, the moral domain at its basic level is immune 
from empirical investigation (and abduction in particular). Moral justification is ultimately 
a matter of a priori intuition and reflection, rather than a business of explanatory inference 
(Audi 1997, 2013; Enoch 2010; FitzPatrick 2008; Parfit 2011; Shafer-Landau 2003). As 
Kieran Setiya says, 
Even if ethical facts explain non-ethical effects, as some have urged, it is not 
by reference to those effects that our beliefs are typically justified. Most often, 
when we know an ethical fact, we have little idea what it explains, if it 
explains anything at all (Setiya 2012, pp. 48-49). 
 
Many moral judgments that we make don’t seem to rely on any kind of empirical inquiry. 
Suppose that someone, upon due reflection, believes that killing an innocent person for 
fun is wrong. But she doesn’t have any clue whatsoever how moral facts can help explain 
natural phenomena. Should we deny, for this reason, that her belief is a justified belief or 
knowledge? It seems not. Most people form their basic moral beliefs in a way that 
involves no explanatory inference or empirical investigation at all. So, moral empiricism 
would lead to an absurd conclusion that most people (perhaps except moral empiricists 
themselves) have no moral knowledge. Moral empiricism is in conflict with the 
phenomenology of moral inquiry. 
To argue that moral justification is a priori is to argue that moral beliefs can be 
justified without appealing to empirical evidence (regardless of whether a priori 
justification is understood in an internalist or externalist way). A priori justification is not 
queer. We are justified in holding many fundamental truths (epistemic, mathematical, 
logical, linguistic, etc.) that don’t seem to rely on empirical investigation. For example, the 
IBE principle itself seems to be a priori. If we try to justify this principle by appeal to 
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experience, there would be either circularity or infinite regress (for most recent defenses of 
the a priority of IBE, see e.g. Biggs and Wilson 2016). 
I am sympathetic with the possibility of a priori moral knowledge, but a full 
assessment of the debate between moral empiricism and intuitionism is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Here let us rather focus on a further move made by the soft realist: given 
the truth of moral intuitionism, [E0] is false. According to the soft realist, since moral 
knowledge is not the product of explanatory inference (or empirical inquiry in general), 
the explanatory efficacy of moral facts is unnecessary for moral knowledge. However, I 
will argue, this move is problematic. The inference from the truth of moral intuitionism to 
the falsity of [E0] is invalid. What moral intuitionism actually challenges is not [E0], but 
another thesis [E2]: 
[E2] We can have moral knowledge only if moral beliefs are results of inference to 
the best explanation. 
 
While [E0] is based on the general idea that we can have knowledge about a domain of 
facts F only if F explains facts in other domains (call it the Explanatory Tracking Condition on 
Knowledge), [E2] rather derives from the generic thesis that we can have knowledge about a 
domain of facts F only if the beliefs about F are results of inference to the best explanation 
(call it the Explanatory Inference Condition on Knowledge). The explanatory inference condition 
is a more restrictive and less plausible account than the explanatory tracking condition is. 
Whereas the former fails to accommodate some domains of knowledge, the latter can still 
hold in those domains.  
Certainly, the two accounts can converge on some cases of knowledge. Let me 
give an example. I came back to my apartment. The door is broken; the room is messy; 
cash and credit cards have disappeared (although it is a little bit comforting that 
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philosophy books are still there). Then I believe that a burglar broke into my home. 
Suppose that this is true. My belief should be regarded as knowledge. On the one hand, 
the burglary metaphysically explains the occurrence of my belief. The explanatory 
tracking condition applies to this case. On the other hand, my belief was formed as a 
result of inference to the best explanation. Why do I believe that there was a burglary? 
This is because assuming a burglary can best explain the phenomena I observed. The 
explanatory inference condition also works in this case.  
However, there are some domains of knowledge that the explanatory inference 
condition fails to accommodate (but the explanatory tracking condition still can). First of 
all, knowledge by explanatory inference is inferential knowledge. the explanatory inference 
condition thus cannot accommodate non-derivative, self-justified knowledge. For 
example, I am aware, by appeal to introspection alone, that I am in pain. My belief about 
pain is knowledge, although it is not a result of explanatory inference. But pain is still 
relevant in explaining the occurrence of my belief about pain—it is pain that helps to 
explain why I believe that I am in pain. Whereas non-inferential knowledge is a 
counterexample to the explanatory inference condition, the explanatory tracking 
condition can accommodate such a case quite well.  
Moreover, since explanatory inference is typically a form of a posteriori inference, 
the explanatory inference condition cannot apply to a priori knowledge, such as 
mathematical knowledge (regardless of whether it is basic or derivative). For example, 
many believe, solely by mathematical reasoning, that the sum of the angles of a triangle in 
a plane is equal to 180°. They have no idea whether mathematical propositions can help 
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explain physical phenomena. Those mathematical beliefs could still be knowledge. Thus, 
the explanatory inference condition fails in the mathematical domain.13  
Nevertheless, this is far from saying that mathematical facts cannot explain facts in 
other domains. Consider an example of mathematical explanation. Honeybees use 
hexagonal cells to build their honeycombs. But why hexagons? The dominant 
explanation among biologists is that natural selection would choose those bees that made 
their honeycombs in the most efficient manner with the minimal amount of wax. This 
explanation in fact appeals to a mathematical truth, the so-called ‘Honeycomb Theorem’: 
A hexagonal grid is the most efficient way to divide a Euclidean plane into regions of 
equal area with least total perimeter (Lyon 2012; see also Baker 2005). Moreover, 
mathematical facts can figure in the evolutionary explanations of our mathematical 
beliefs. If our (basic) mathematical beliefs were false—or if putative mathematical facts 
represented by our beliefs didn’t obtain—then human beings would not have survived 
and evolved to hold those beliefs (Baker 2005; Batterman 2010; Gibbard 2003; Joyce 
2006; Sosa 2002). Hence, the explanatory tracking condition can accommodate 
mathematical knowledge. 
When moral intuitionists deny the explanatory condition on moral knowledge, 
they seem to have the explanatory inference condition in mind (Audi 1997, 2013; Parfit 
2011; Setiya 2012). But I see no good reason why the intuitionist should reject the 
explanatory tracking condition. As I have mentioned above, the explanatory tracking 
                                               
13 It is worth noticing that what I deny is that explanatory inference is a necessary condition on mathematical 
knowledge. I would leave it open whether mathematical explanation could be one epistemic source of 
mathematical knowledge. According to some philosophers, we are justified in postulating mathematical 
entities if mathematics plays an indispensable role in scientific explanations (Putnam 1975). This is 
compatible with what I am saying here. If we can have mathematical knowledge either by explanatory 
inference or by a priori intuition, this would be an example of epistemic overdetermination (Shafer-Landau 
2003). But even in this case, explanatory inference is an unnecessary condition on mathematical knowledge. 
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condition is true for the mathematical domain, although mathematical knowledge is a 
priori. So, even if the moral domain is a priori and non-natural, it doesn’t follow that moral 
knowledge is immune from the explanatory tracking requirement. Thus, [E0] remains 
unchallenged. 
 
4. The Third-factor Approach 
In this current section, let us turn to an increasingly popular version of soft realism, the 
so-called ‘third-factor’ account, which attempts to provide an alternative model of moral 
knowledge that doesn’t assume the explanatory efficacy of moral facts. According to the 
third-factor account, we can have moral knowledge as long as moral facts and 
corresponding moral beliefs are reliably caused or explained by a third factor, even if moral 
facts don’t help explain the occurrences of moral beliefs (Audi 2013; Enoch 2010, 2011; 






T stands for the third factor, which explains both the belief B and the corresponding fact 
F. Consider Robert Audi’s third-factor account first. For example, I see a person burning 
a cat for fun, and I come to believe that he is doing something evil. According to Audi, 
the moral belief that the person is doing something evil (B) is not caused or explained by 











setting a cat on fire (T), which ontologically explains the moral fact that he is doing 
something evil (F). Thus, both F and B are explained by the third factor T. 
David Enoch proposes a similar but more complicated third-factor account. He 
puts it this way: 
Survival (or whatever) is good; so behaving in ways that promote it is (pro 
tanto) good; but one efficient way of pushing us in the direction of acting in 
those ways is by pushing us to believe that it is good to act in those ways. 
And in fact, as we have just seen, it is good so to act. So the normative beliefs 
this mechanism pushes us to have will tend to be true (Enoch 2010, p. 431). 
 
People believe, say, that helping others is good. On an evolutionary account, this moral 
belief (B) is ultimately explained by the non-moral fact that helping behavior contributes 
to survival (T), but not by the moral fact that helping others is good (F). Moreover, 
according to Enoch, the non-moral fact T realizes or grounds the moral fact F. That is, T 
is the third factor that explains both F and B. 
Before proceeding to my criticisms of the third-factor account, I want to 
emphasize a methodological constraint that any reasonable account of moral knowledge 
is subject to: an account of moral knowledge must not be ad hoc. That is, there should be 
properly analogous third-factor cases in other domains of knowledge. After all, third-
factor theorists are not moral quietists; they do not believe that moral epistemology is 
unique or sui generis.14 The third-factor theorist is, in Mackie’s words, “looking for 
companions in guilt” (Mackie 1977, p. 39). 
Now let’s consider a typical third-factor example in non-moral domains. An 
earthquake occurred in Los Angeles in early July. A meteorologist then infers that there 
will be a tsunami in Los Angeles in late July. Suppose that her belief is knowledge. But 
                                               
14 A notorious example of moral quietism is Scanlon (2014). 
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this belief occurring in early July is not explained by the fact that there will be a tsunami in 
Los Angeles in late July. How could a future event explain a present event? It is safe to 
exclude the possibility of backward explanation. Rather, both the meteorologist’s belief 
that a tsunami will occur in Los Angeles in late July and the corresponding fact are 
explained by a third factor, i.e., the fact that an earthquake occurred in Los Angeles in 
early July (for similar examples, see Goldman 1967; Sosa 1999).15  
On closer examinations, nevertheless, we will find that such third-factor examples 
fail to raise a serious challenge to [E0], whereas they call into question another thesis [E3]: 
[E3] S can have moral knowledge that P only if the moral fact that P explains the 
occurrence of S’s moral belief that P. 
 
In some third-factor cases, although F doesn’t explain the occurrence of B, B should still 
be regarded as knowledge. Such cases are thus counterexamples to (a generic version of) 
[E3]. However, they don’t threaten the plausibility of [E0]. Consider the tsunami example 
again. As we know, the fact that there is a tsunami in Los Angeles in late July doesn’t 
explain the meteorologist’s corresponding belief occurring in early July. But it is far from 
saying that tsunamic facts can never explain other facts (including the occurrences of 
tsunamic beliefs). For example, the fact that there is a tsunami in Los Angeles in late July 
can explain why some buildings in the coastal area collapsed then. This fact can also 
explain the occurrences of some tsunamic beliefs—imagine that a person observed the 
tsunami in Los Angeles in late July. On the other hand, although the meteorologist’s 
particular belief that there is a tsunami in Los Angeles in late July is not explained by the 
                                               
15 Audi also offers an example of non-moral knowledge. I see a powerful bomb explode next to a soldier but 
somehow do not directly see the resulting death. Suppose that I believe that the soldier is dead. It is 
reasonable to regard my belief as knowledge. But, in this case, my belief that the soldier is dead is not 
explained by the corresponding fact. Rather, the belief that he is dead and the corresponding fact are both 
explained by a third factor, that is, the fact that a bomb exploded near the soldier (Audi 2013). 
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corresponding fact, it is reasonable to assume that some other tsunamic facts figure in the 
etiology of this belief. Probably, this particular tsunamic belief can be causally traced back 
to other tsunamic beliefs that the meteorologist acquired long time ago, which in turn are 
explained by the corresponding tsunamic facts. 
By the same token, even if there are some third-factor cases of moral knowledge in 
which the moral belief that P is not explained by the moral fact that P, it doesn’t follow 
that moral facts can never explain moral beliefs. It could be the case that the moral fact 
explains other moral beliefs, or the case that the moral belief is explained by other moral 
facts. In either situation, [E0] still holds. But according to the third-factor moral theorist, 
no moral facts can explain non-moral facts—every instance of moral knowledge is a third-
factor case. So, the third-factor account of moral knowledge has no “companions in guilt” 
in non-moral domains—this account fails to respect the methodological constraint.  
Moreover, in what follows, I will develop an argument against the third-factor 
version of soft realism by proposing a sophisticated sensitivity condition on knowledge in 
contrast with a simple sensitivity condition: 
[SENSITIVITY] S knows that P only if the belief that P is sensitive to the fact that P. 
(The Simple Sensitivity Condition) 
 
[SENSITIVITY+] S knows that P only if either (i) the belief that P is sensitive; or (ii) 
the belief that P is legitimately inferred from other sensitive beliefs. (The 
Sophisticated Sensitivity Condition)16 
 
S’s belief that P is sensitive to the fact that P if and only if S would not believe that P if P 
were false—that is, if and only if S does not believe that P in the closest ~P-worlds (Nozick 
1981; Murphy and Black 2012). There is an intimate connection between sensitivity and 
                                               
16 This is similar to Lewis’s counterfactual account of causation. Although c’s being the cause of e doesn’t 
require that e counterfactually depend on c, it does require that there be a chain of counterfactual 
dependence from e to c. 
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explanatory tracking. Suppose that a domain of facts is explanatorily responsible for the 
occurrences of our beliefs about this domain. It follows from a counterfactual account of 
explanation that the beliefs counterfactually depend on the corresponding facts—that is, 
if the facts didn’t obtain, we wouldn’t hold the beliefs. This is equivalent to saying that the 
beliefs are sensitive to the relevant facts.  
It is worth noting that the simple sensitivity condition on knowledge 
[SENSITIVITY] is an indefensible view (see Sosa 1999). For example, it fails to 
accommodate benign third-factor cases. If e1 and e2 are two explananda of a common 
explanans, e1 and e2 do not stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence.17 Thus, the 
target belief in the third-factor model doesn’t counterfactually depend on the 
corresponding fact—in other words, the belief is insensitive. In the tsunami example, the 
meteorologist’s belief that there is a tsunami in Los Angeles in late July is not sensitive to 
the corresponding fact. Even if counterfactually no tsunami occurred in Los Angeles in 
late July, the meteorologist would still believe so based on her knowledge of the 
earthquake in early July.  
In contrast, the sophisticated sensitivity condition [SENSITIVITY+] can 
accommodate such benign third-factor cases, in which although clause (i) is not met, 
clause (ii) is satisfied. In the tsunami example, the target belief that there is a tsunami in 
                                               
17 When e1 and e2 are two effects of a common cause, it follows from the standard non-backtracking reading of 
counterfactuals that no counterfactual dependence holds between e1 and e2 (see Lewis 1973). Things become 
more complicated if the third-factor case involves ontological explanation. Suppose that the moral fact M 
and the corresponding belief B are explained by a third-factor natural fact N that realizes or grounds M. 
Does B counterfactually depend on M in this case? My answer is no. We should develop a semantics of 
counterfactuals that disallows that two explananda of a common explanans stand in a relationship of 
counterfactual dependence. This could be an interesting topic for further investigation. Here I can only 
make a tentative suggestion: the reason why B doesn’t counterfactually depend on M is perhaps that in the 
closest impossible worlds where M doesn’t obtain while N obtains, B will still occur. Nowadays many 
philosophers adopt a non-trivial reading of counterpossibles (counterfactual conditionals with impossible 
antecedents), according to which some counterpossibles are non-vacuously true and others non-vacuously 
false. See e.g. Bjerring (2014); Brogaard and Salerno (2013); Nolan (1997). 
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Los Angeles in late July (B) is not a sensitive belief, but it is legitimately inferred from a 
sensitive belief. This intermediate belief that an earthquake occurred in Los Angeles in 
early July is sensitive to the corresponding fact. If there were no earthquake in early July, 
the meteorologist would not believe so. That is, [SENSITIVITY+] is satisfied. 
[SENSITIVITY+] can thus distinguish malign third-factor cases from benign third-
factor cases. For example, suppose that Descartes’s evil demon has instilled into you a 
series of hallucinations to the extent that your beliefs about the environment are never 
caused by the external physical objects. Meanwhile, the evil demon brings about the 
external objects in such a way that your beliefs about your surroundings reliably correlate 
with the relevant facts. In this case, it is safe to say that your hallucinatory beliefs are not 
knowledge, even though they are reliably true (Cuneo 2018).18  
Malign third-factor cases such as the evil demon case don’t meet either clause (i) 
or clause (ii). On the one hand, as opposed to veridical perceptual beliefs, hallucinatory 
beliefs in the evil demon case are not sensitive to the corresponding facts. On the other 
hand, unlike the target belief in a benign third-factor case, hallucinatory beliefs are not 
inferred from other sensitive beliefs—hallucinatory beliefs are basic, non-inferential 
beliefs in the same way that perceptual beliefs are. Hence, according to [SENSITIVITY+], 
hallucinatory beliefs are not knowledge. See the table below: 
 Clause (i) Clause (ii) 
Veridical Perceptual Cases √ × 
Benign Third-factor Cases × √ 
Malign Third-factor Cases × × 
                                               
18 Reliability is a major selling point of the third-factor account (Enoch 2010). However, as we can learn 
from the evil demon case, mere reliability is insufficient for knowledge. 
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Now let us turn back to morality. Is the target moral belief in the third-factor model an 
inferential belief or not? If yes, we can ask further whether the target moral belief is 
inferred, at least partially, from other moral beliefs, or instead solely from non-moral 
beliefs. To answer that the inferential base includes moral beliefs is unsatisfactory. Are the 
intermediate moral beliefs sensitive to the corresponding moral facts? Does the 
explanatory condition [E0] apply to those moral beliefs? The problem is only pushed one 
step back.  
Alternatively, it could be suggested that the target moral belief is inferred from 
non-moral beliefs alone. In this scenario, we can safely say that (at least some of) those 
non-moral beliefs are beliefs about the empirical world, such as physical, biological, 
psychological, and social beliefs—it is unlikely that the non-moral beliefs that could justify 
a moral belief are solely a priori. If moral beliefs are justified in an a posteriori way, then this 
would be a case of moral empiricism. But like other soft realists, third-factor theorists are 
also committed to an intuitionist moral epistemology.  
Here is a reason why soft moral realists should reject moral empiricism. Inference 
to the best explanation seems to be the only valid form of a posteriori inference. If moral 
knowledge is acquired by empirical inference as we currently assume, moral beliefs must 
be the results of IBE. In that situation, moral facts would figure in the best explanations of 
some non-moral phenomena. This almost amounts to saying that moral facts can play 
(metaphysically) explanatory roles in non-moral domains—in other words, we should 
accept hard moral realism.19 
                                               
19 I don’t hold the view that all empirical knowledge is based on inference to the best explanation. 
Obviously, non-inferential empirical knowledge (such as perceptual knowledge and proprioceptive knowledge) 
is not a product of IBE. But it is safe to say that if moral knowledge is empirical knowledge, it must be 
inferential empirical knowledge (see Boyd 1988; Railton 1986; Sayre-McCord 1988). I am grateful to a 
reviewer of the Journal for pressing me to address this issue. 
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It is thus unsurprising that all third-factor theorists hold the view that the target 
moral beliefs in their models are non-inferential beliefs (Audi 2013; Enoch 2010; 
Wielenberg 2010). On Audi’s third-factor account, we can directly “see” a moral fact 
without the mediation of inference. For example, although someone’s putting a cat on fire 
caused me to have the moral belief that this person is doing something wrong, my belief is  
not inferred from any non-moral beliefs.20 Also, in Enoch’s version, our basic moral 
beliefs are clearly non-inferential beliefs, since they were caused by evolutionary forces. 
However, if no inference is involved in the third-factor model, it looks like a malign third-
factor case. Moral beliefs would be similar to hallucinatory beliefs in the evil demon case 
in that they are neither sensitive nor inferential—[SENSITIVITY+] is violated. Therefore, it 
is unreasonable to regard such moral beliefs as knowledge.  
 
5. Conclusion 
As I have argued thus far, the soft moral realist cannot reasonably reject the explanatory 
condition on moral knowledge [E0] and hence has trouble accommodating moral 
knowledge. Certainly, even if the existence of moral knowledge requires that moral facts 
exert explanatory powers in non-moral domains, it is another issue whether they can in 
fact play such an explanatory role. While some dismiss the viability of moral explanation 
(Audi 1997; Enoch 2011; Gibbard 2003; Harman 1977; Wright 1992), others attempt to 
defend the explanatory efficacy of moral facts (Bengson 2015; Cuneo 2006; Railton 1986; 
Sturgeon 1985; Wedgwood 2007). This is still an ongoing debate, deserving more 
                                               
20 It is controversial to say that the moral belief in the burning cat example is a non-inferential belief. This 
moral belief seems to be inferred from the non-moral belief that someone is putting a cat on fire in 
conjunction with a more basic moral belief, say, the belief that causing pain to an animal is wrong. If so, this 
is a case in which the target moral belief is inferred partially from another moral belief. 
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discussion than I am able to provide here. In this article, I have instead argued for a 
weaker thesis that one should not accept soft realism if one is already a moral realist. 
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